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1. Introduction · 
A question of the form "what is X?" can be used for various purposes. In one usage, 
where the speaker is referring by using the expression X to a specific entity, say Y, he or she 
is inquiring about Y. The first sentence of the dialogue in (1) is a case in point. 
(1) Speaker A: What is that? 
Speaker B: It's Clutton-Brock's new book on behavioral ecology. 
"What are Chomsky's views on the Gulf war?" can also be classified into this group. In 
another usage, "What is X?" is employed to ask "What is the word/expression X used to refer 
to?" In this case, the speaker is asking about the connection between form(sound) and 
meaning. "What is love?" is an example of this usage. Partly (but only .partly) for the 
arbitrariness of sound-meaning pairing, it is pointless to ask "What is X?" in this second sense 
unless particular purposes and context of inquiry are specified. Anything could be an answer 
to the question depending on the context. For instance, Japanese would have the following 
conversation. 
(2) . Speaker A: What is love? 
Speaker B: To wait. 
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"What is idiolect?" belongs to the second usage, hence it is not something one can 
ask out of the blue. Alexander George in his "Whose language is it anyway? Some notes on 
idiolects" (George, 1990) asks and tries to answer this question without explicitly stating his 
purposes of dosing so. As a result, the paper is quite confusing and (appears to) contain(s) a 
number of inconsistencies. As I understand it, George (1990) tries to find a notion that 
satisfies the following three conditions, and wants to call it a idiolect. 
(3) George's purpose is to find a notion that 
i) is (at least loosely) related to some features of common views of idiolect, and 
ii) makes sense from current generative grammatical point of view as adopted by 
George, and 
iii) captures George's intuition about certain phenomena. 
Assuming that this is indeed his purpose, in this short note, I will critically review George 
(1990). 
2. Common Views of Idiolects 
George first discusses three popular views of idiolect, and points out their anomalies. 
He then presents his own view. The whole discussion presupposes the following distinction 
between idiolect and grammar, which George takes to be essential: x's idiolect is an abstract 
entity "about which [x] has intricate beliefs, many true, perhaps some false" (p.276)~ x's 
grammar is "[t]he structure that is characterized by what [x] believe[s] about the syntactic, 
semantic, and phonological properties of expressions" (p.276) of x's idiolect. Thus, 
according to him, one has only partial knowledge of his own idiolect, and his grammar is a 
central part of that knowledge. One's grammar generates his or her idiolect only when he or 
she has perfect knowledge of it (= his dialect). Note that for George, both idiolect and 
grammar are platonic objects ( cf. George, 1989). 
With this distinction made, George starts a survey of commonly held views of 
idiolect. George discusses three positions. Before going to examine them, however, I 
would like to mention an idea which is not directly dealt with in his paper but has some 
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bearing on the first of the three positions taken up by George. This view, which might be 
called "communicational view", says that people in a community share some stable body of . 
linguistic information, and thanks to this shared information they can communicate with one 
another. One's language ( = idiolect) is that shared linguistic information sufficient for 
communicational purposes. 
"No such thing view", the first of the three positions examined by George, denies the 
communicational view". It claims that wide range of communicational phenomena shows 
that our idiolects are so vary with the present moment, audience and speaker that no two 
people are likely to share an idiolect. Further, it is not likely that an individual has the same 
idiolect at any two times. Thus, those linguists and philosophers are mistaken who took 
themselves to be characterizing some shared and stable body of information sufficient for 
communicational purposes, because there is no such thing. 
An example of communicational phenomena apparently supporting the no such thing 
view is malapropism, a ludicrous substitution of one word for another which is similar to it 
(e.g. ''The book was banned because it flaunted (cf. flouted) social convention of its time.") 
George distinguishes three cases. 
(4) i) The speaker uses a malaprop unintentionally. 
ii) The speaker uses a malaprop deliberately, believing that it is a correct usage. 
iii) The speaker intends to deviate from the literal meaning of a word. 
The first case is purely a performance error, so there is no reason to believe that the speaker's 
idiolect has altered. The second case at best causes a change in our beliefs about the 
speaker's idiolect, rather than the idiolect itself. If this speaker is later brought to agree that 
he has erred, under George's idiolect/grammar system mentioned earlier, what is changed is 
not his idiolect, rather it is his grammar (i.e. his beliefs about his idiolect). Thus, the second 
case is not an instance of a change in idiolect, either. The third case is different from the 
other two cases in that it could lead to a change of one's idiolect. That is, if the speaker's 
direct intention succeeds in effecting a change of meaning, for example, and if this is reflected 
in a subsequent change in the hearer's characterization of that idiolect, then, this can be 
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regarded as a case of alternation in the speaker's idiolect. Since this happens frequently in 
response to various factors such as audience, time, etc., it is impossible to share the same 
idiolect for very long. Therefore, the idea of language as something stable should be 
rejected. 
George argues that no such thing view is based on a serious misconception of the 
field of current linguistics. First, the object of linguists and language-minded philosophers' 
inquiry is not something sufficient for communication, rather general/central features 
common to idiolects of normal speakers, often called "Universal Grammar". UG constitutes 
only one element of what is involved in communication, and UG's information alone is not 
(necessarily) sufficient for communicational purposes. Second, even though we might be 
able to alter some aspects of lexical information with our intention, the central features of UG 
are stable enough for linguists to study. We cannot alter them simply by so intending. For 
example, we cannot change the quantifier scope interpretations of the following sentences if 
so intending. In (5), either who or every can have wide scope, whereas in (6), every cannot 
take scope over who. 
(5) 
(6) 
Who does everyone likes? 
Who likes everyone? 
(who>every, every>who) 
(who>every, *every>who) 
Thus, the object of linguists' current inquiry is more modest and stable than proponents of the 
no such thing view seem to believe. 
A second position of idiolect George discusses is the "no-error view". According to 
this view, one cannot err about one's own idiolect/language, because an individual's language 
at a particular time is characterized by that individual's linguistic beliefs at that time. A 
person might say that he was in error and alter his beliefs, but this is more of the result of 
intimidation or socialization than anything relevant to the identity of his idiolect. In other 
words, "being in error" means believing something different from the communal language. 
This account is unconvincing, for it fails to capture the phenomenology of error, 
George contends. "When I came to believe that 'livid' does not mean red but rather bluish 
grey, I then took myself to have been in error" (p.289). In this case, according to the non-
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error view, there are really two words that are pronounced the same, one in the communal 
language with the meaning bluish grey (lividbluish grey), the other in his (then) language with the 
meaning red (lividred). But George took himself to have always used the very word 'livid' 
that he now employs. It seems that one can be in error about one's own language, w·here this 
does not consist merely in a failure of intention or in performance errors One can have false 
beliefs about one's own language. 
I do not think George's observation is very damaging to the non-error view. There 
is a possible explanation for the observation consistent with the non-error view: "I" ( = 
George) have information about the word 'livid' in "my" lexicon, which include its 
pronunciation, meaning, grammatical category, spelling, etc. And these various kinds of 
information are related to other lexical and non-lexical information. When "I" came to 
believe that "I" was in error and altered "my" belief about the meaning of 'livid', "I" only 
changed a part of the information of 'livid', i.e. meaning. The other parts of the lexical 
information of 'livid' were not altered. Especially, the information regarding spelling and 
pronunciation, which plays relatively an important role in identifying a lexical item, remains 
in tact. . Thus, livi~ and lividbluish grey are very similar to each other in their lexical 
information. This similarity accounts for George's psychology of his taking himself to have 
always used the very word 'livid'. 
In sum, George argues that (i) for the non-error view to be correct, there must be two 
words, livi~ and lividbluish grey' (ii) George feels that he has been using only one word 'livid', 
(iii) (i) and (ii) contradict each other, (iv) therefore, the non-error view must be wrong. I 
have suggested above that even if we grant him (i), (iii) does not follow, because George 
could wrongly feels that he has been using only one word, misled by the similarity between 
lividred and lividbluishgrey· George's criticism of the non-error view, thus, is not valid. 
Let us now tum to the "communitarian view". This view says that a person's 
idiolect at a given time is determined by his or her imperfect grasp at that moment of the 
correct account of the communal language. Mismatch between a person's idiolect and the 
communal language signals error. 
The problem of this view, according to George, is with the conception of the 
communal language as entity that is explanatorily prior to the grammars of individual 
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speakers. On grounds of economy, it would be preferable to give an account of linguistic 
error which does not require appeal to any notion conceptually prior to that of grammars of 
individuals at particular times, since current empirical linguistics is committed to the latter 
notion anyway. 
I agree with George that it is problematic to assume the communal language to be 
explanatorily prior to the grammar. However, I cannot agree on his reason for it. No 
matter how uneconomical something appears to be, we must accept it if it is a fact. The real 
reason that the communitarian view cannot be correct, I believe, is either of the following 
two: i) the communal language cannot be defined without a prior notion of individuals' 
grammars, or ii) the communal language cannot be defined at all (Can you define what 
Japanese is?). 
3. George's Idiolect 
Finally, George's view: The collections of principles and parameters of UG are fixed 
on the basis of primary linguistic data available to a learner. As a result, it yields a core 
grammar that becomes what is known by the given speaker. This core grammar goes some· 
way to identifying the idiolect of the speaker. But it must be supplemented with a periphery 
of constructions, lexical information, etc., whose identity is partly determined by the 
considered changes the speaker would make to his or her linguistic beliefs on the basis of 
interaction with other speakers. Thus, "[g]rammars are prior in order of explanation" 
(p.297). However, idiolect is prior in order of normativity, George argues. It remains 
unclear exactly what determines the identity of a speaker's idiolect, and George does not 
hesitate to say, "I do not pretend to have a complete answer to this question." 
This identification problem arises from his conception of idiolect and grammar as 
abstract entities that exist independently of speakers. Note further that the characterization 
of grammar and idiolect given by George at the very beginning of the paper are slightly 
different from the one stated in the final part. He started the paper by saying that speaker's 
grammar is a partial grasp of his/her idiolect. However, at the end of the paper, he says that 
grammar is prior to idiolect in order of explanation. How could it be possible that a partial 
grasp of an idiolect (= a grammar) be prior to the very idiolect in order of explanation? 
-14-
Further, how could we know if we are wrong about our idiolect, if our idiolect, which is 
normatively prior, "perhaps is never to be realized solely to account for his intuition about 
"phenomenology of error" mentioned above when we talked about the non-error view. Now 
that his intuition would receive a natural explanation without recourse to those notions, as I 
suggested there, George's characterization of idiolect has lost its motivation. 
It seems to me that (a variant of) the non-error view is basically correct except that 
there is no need of reference to one's belief. One cannot err in one's own idiolect/lanauge 
because an individual's language at particular time is characterized by that individual's 
linguistic knowledge at that time. We cannot be wrong in our own languages (though we 
can . be wrong about our own languages), and "being in error" is a social matter: "Being in 
eroor" means having knowledge whose cetain aspect is different from the comparable aspects 
of the knowledge of some (many, or most) speakers of the community. It has nothing to do 
with the identity of one's idiolect. Thus, there is no room in empirical linguistics for 
platonic objects to play a role in. 
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